Our security model is that we never have your data.
There is no OrgTool cloud, no tenant, no backup of your org on our side. The most sensitive dataset in your company — who reports to whom, who earns what, who is on a list — stays on the machine of the person planning with it. This page is short because the architecture is.
What "cryptographic" means here, precisely.
A member's key material unlocks the primary payload of an encrypted .orgpack — that's the shared-passphrase model, and every admin, editor, and viewer with the passphrase can open the file. The optional cost/demographics/notes sidecar is a separate encrypted payload, wrapped under a second, distinct admin passphrase that editors and viewers are never given. That second secret is what makes field scoping a real cryptographic boundary rather than a UI-layer filter someone could bypass by reading the file directly.
Subtree scoping — handing a manager a copy limited to their part of the org — is not cryptographic. The member's key still unlocks the whole org tree; the app filters what it displays after decrypting everything. Treat it as a UI convenience, not data minimization: someone who later obtains broader key material for the same file can see the whole org.
What we don't claim.
- —No end-to-end encryption of everything. Only the primary payload and (when configured) the sidecar are encrypted; the plaintext file header (member emails, roles) is tamper-evident, not itself secret.
- —No FEK rotation on revoke, today. Removing a member doesn't re-key the file — re-encrypt with a new passphrase to actually cut off a former member's access.
- —No SOC 2, FIPS validation, or other compliance certification. None exists for this product at this stage, and we won't claim one that isn't real.
- —No on-premise deployment or SSO/SAML integration. Not available today.
Verification key.
One Ed25519 key signs both our licences and the countersignature on an audit pack. Its public half is below and is compiled into the verifier that ships inside the app, so a licence cannot be forged even by someone holding the whole bundle. Publishing it here is what lets a regulator, an auditor or opposing counsel check a countersigned pack without an account with us.
The private half has never been in the repository or on a build machine.
Check the fingerprint against this page over HTTPS before trusting a key you were sent by any other route.
Verifying a countersigned pack
An audit pack ships with a sibling .sig.json. Two ways to check it, and neither requires our cooperation beyond this page.
Ed25519-verify the file’s signature over the UTF-8 JSON of its payload, byte for byte as written, using the key above. Then confirm the inputHash in that payload matches the one inside the pack’s report.json.
POST the payload and signature to api.orgtool.io/api/audit/verify. No authentication.
If we ever rotate this key, both the old and new keys stay listed here with their validity dates — a pack signed under a retired key must remain verifiable for as long as anyone might need to rely on it.
Frequently asked questions
Answers restate claims verified file-by-file against the current build — see claims/ in the site repo. Last verified July 2026.
Where is my org data stored?
What encryption protects an .orgpack?
Can OrgTool recover a lost passphrase or a deleted file?
What network calls does the app ever make?
Is field-level access control cryptographic?
Are you SOC 2 or ISO 27001 certified?
Do the AI features change any of this?
OrgTool's security model is that we never have your data: the app is a single self-contained file that computes everything locally, org data lives in your browser and in .orgpack files you keep, and the only network calls — sign-in and opt-in AI analysis with your own key — happen by your own action. Files encrypt at rest with AES-256-GCM (PBKDF2-SHA256, 100,000 iterations), a separate admin passphrase can cryptographically scope cost and demographic fields, restructuring exports are deterministic and SHA-256-stamped, and our Ed25519 verification key is public so an audit pack can be verified offline, forever, without us. No SOC 2 is claimed and no on-prem or SSO exists today — this page says exactly what is and isn't true.